About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

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Thursday
29Oct2009

399. My, aren't we special

I think it's probably coincidence that these two items appeared within days of each other.  But I don't think their results aren't coincidental.  First, from D.C. federal court:

The Federal Trade Commission cannot force practicing lawyers to comply with new regulations aimed at curbing identity theft, a federal judge ruled today at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The decision offers a reprieve to law firms across the country, which faced a deadline this weekend to put in place programs to meet so-called “Red Flags Rule” requirements. The rules would have forced firms to verify the identities of potential clients.

Then, from down South, there's this:

In a case of first impression, a federal appellate court ruled Monday in the prosecution of prominent Miami attorney Ben Kuehne that criminal defense lawyers can't be charged with taking ill-gotten proceeds from defendants as legal fees.

The 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by U.S. District Judge Marcia G. Cooke, who dismissed a money-laundering conspiracy count against the attorney for vetting money that went to Miami celebrity attorney Roy Black to defend Colombian drug kingpin Fabio Ochoa.

Kuehne, who has represented a number of high-profile clients including Vice President Al Gore in the 2000 presidential recount, was charged along with two Colombians. Prosecutors charged Kuehne knowingly sent drug money through Colombia's black market peso exchange to pay Black and his team.

Cooke ruled in December that defense attorneys are exempt from prosecution under the money-laundering statute. Congress in 1988 carved out an exemption for lawyers to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of their choice.

As far as I know, both rulings are legally correct, or at least "correct" in the sense of not being subject to getting overturned anytime soon.

Still, it's comforting, isn't it, to know that the people who apply law to lawyers take such good care of us?  For example, in all my assiduous reading of Crawford decisions (see post 63)--and all my non-assiduous reading, too (fed habe cases can be insanely boring to read)--I've only discovered one category of civil proceeding in which the full evidence-suppressing regime is enforced.  It involves disciplinary actions against members of one particular profession.  Here's a hint: it's not the medical profession.

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