About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

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« 300. Another round number | Main | 298. Round up »
Saturday
Aug112007

299. Prosecutorial misconduct

"Prosecutorial misconduct" is one of those great phrases, like "right to life" and "right to choose," that settles the argument before it begins.  It's an example of "unspeak," or more formally of framing.   The phrase "prosecutorial misconduct" is all over the internet, as it is all over the legal world.  A Westlaw search of national criminal law cases found 9,574 usages of the phrase since 2004.  (Westlaw won't return more than 10,000 hits for a search.)

Prosecutors shouldn't feel too paranoid, though.  "Ineffective assistance" is the roughly corresponding term applied to defense lawyers.  It means that the defendant was only convicted because his (or, occasionally, her) defense lawyer "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment"   That's an essentially vegetative standard: it means the lawyer was so hopelessly incompetent that he or she really was Brendan Sullivan's potted plant.  

The phrase "ineffective assistance" has appeared in 8,315 opinions in the Westlaw database just since the beginning of this year.  No joke. 

Obviously, then, we have an epidemic of incompetent defense lawyers out there to go with our epidemic of evil prosecutors.  Either that or we have a lot of people in prison who want to get out.

The LA Times recently ran an article on prosecutorial misconduct.  My first thought was that the humor was in poor taste, but on second reading I perceived internal clues raising the disturbing possibility that it may not have been intended as a parody of legal journalism.  The article reads:

[Santa Clara University law professor Cookie] Ridolfi, the director of the Northern California Innocence Project, told the commission that judges had found prosecutorial misconduct in 443 of more than 2,100 California cases over the last 10 years. Ridolfi said that figure was just "the tip of the iceberg," because about 97% of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargains. ...

But Michael Schwartz, a deputy district attorney in Ventura County, countered that a close look at the available data shows that prosecutorial misconduct occurs in less than 1% of all cases.

Sounds like a pretty stark disparity, doesn't it?  Wouldn't you expect the reporter to, say, spend a moment or two attempting to explain where the truth lies, or to explain why the speakers were both providing accurate and even non-contradictory numbers? 

And wouldn't it be helpful to the reader to know what the subject of their debate - "prosecutorial misconduct" - means?  The reporter, Henry Weinstein, doesn't think so - or, more likely, doesn't himself know.

Patterico provides a hilariously-thorough takedown of Weinstein here.  Despite Professor Ridolfi's anti-feminist credentials as frontwoman for the Rape-Decriminalization Project (hey, two can play at the unspeak game) (see post 246 and post 290), there's no reason to think that the figures dug up by her work-study helper Jessica Marz are skewed.  Ms. Marz simply concluded that out of 2,130 cases in which prosecutorial misconduct was alleged, appellate judges agreed with the defense 443 times.  But during the same time period, of course, California's many appellate courts heard vastly more than 2,130 criminal appeals.  So the professor's figures didn't actually contradict those of the deputy district attorney. 

How hard would it have been for the LA Times to explain that to its readers?  Ah, but that's not a journalist's job, you see.  We're objective, we just report the facts.  If our presentation of the facts deprives them of all meaning, well, that's because our task is so sacred, you see.  (See post 295.)  As everyone knows, mystery is always at the heart of the sacred.

Anyway, as to the even more basic question (what is prosecutorial misconduct?), we can turn for guidance to the reliably-entertaining Kansas Supreme Court.  (See post 284.)   In the course of affirming Martin Miller's conviction for murdering his wife - a very  big story in Lawrence, home of the two Bills, Burroughs and James - the court found the prosecutor had committed misconduct.  You see, in his closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the murderer as ... a killer

No, really.  Horrible, isn't it?  It gets even worse.  The prosecutor, in the summation of the prosecution's case,  used the word "killer" to describe a murderer no fewer than six times.  It almost makes you weep, doesn't it? 

So now you know what "prosecutorial misconduct" means.

Reader Comments (1)

And don't forget the King of the criminal justice system unspeak - the dreaded "judicial error". Hmmm... Prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance, and judicial error. Who is getting the short end of the descriptors there?
August 13, 2007 | Unregistered CommenterI Wear the White Hat

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