About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

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In Our Name
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« 108. Jerk for sure | Main | 106. The ugada principle »
Saturday
06May2006

107. Landlord-tenant law and lawlessness

In 2001, New York Supreme Court justice (=trial court judge) Reynold Mason declared that the courts of New York state were not bound by state law regarding evictions:

Housing Court judge Bernadette Bayne adjourned eviction proceedings against 70-year-old tenant Patricia Menkin for nearly a month, after she asked for time to find a lawyer. The landlord, Carlton Associates, appealed the adjournment, pointing to a 1997 state law that said a housing court postponement can’t take more than 10 days, unless both the tenant and landlord agree to it.

In his February 26 ruling backing Judge Bayne’s postponement, Supreme Court justice Reynold Mason argued that courts have the power to set their own calendars without interference from legislative bodies. Sarcastically dismissing the landlord’s “prayer for relief,” he sharply questioned whether the state legislature has the power to dictate the rules of Housing Court, arguing that the courts “are not puppets of the Legislature, they are an independent branch of government.”

Ironically, by the time Judge Mason ruled on the postponement, Menkin had reached an agreement to repay the back rent she owed.

Ironically?  That means that Judge Mason not only declared himself "independent" of the law itself, but he issued a ruling in a moot case.  But that, as it turned out, was the least of his sins. 

Here's an incident that tells us even more about Judge Mason's attitude toward landlords:

The five charges of misconduct sustained by the Commission centered on [Mason]'s misuse of his attorney escrow account while he was a practicing attorney and after he became a Civil Court Judge. Evidence received at the hearing established that petitioner vacated a rent-stabilized apartment in 1992 and installed his brother-in-law in the apartment over the objection of the landlord. After the brother- in-law's attempts to pay rent directly to the landlord failed, he forwarded his rental payments to petitioner, making all but two of the checks payable to petitioner "as attorney." This  continued each month for several years resulting in petitioner receiving more than $15,000 in rent from his brother-in-law.
Petitioner deposited at least $7,000 of the rent money in his attorney escrow account. The record reveals that petitioner used a portion of the funds to pay personal expenses, writing checks directly from his escrow account to "cash," to himself, and to various creditors. As of December 1994, shortly before petitioner took the bench, his attorney escrow account had a balance of approximately $1,900. While a sitting Judge, petitioner continued using the account for personal purposes, including writing checks to cash, his wife, an automotive finance company, a support collection unit, a church, an extermination firm and a political club.
During the Commission investigation, petitioner stated he had no legal right to retain the rent money. Rather, he claimed he was holding the rent for the landlord with the intent to deliver it at a future time. At the hearing, however, petitioner contended he had lawfully sublet the apartment to his brother-in-law and therefore had a right to personally collect rent on the apartment and to use the rent proceeds to pay personal expenses.

More detail in provided in the specification of charges by the Commission on Judicial Conduct.

When Judge Mason was removed from the bench for chiseling the landlord and embezzling his brother-in-law's money, his attorney was defiant and contemptuous:

Mason, a Democrat who was first elected a lower court civil judge in 1995 and then won a 14-year term as a Supreme Court civil justice in 1997, "is in complete disbelief," said his attorney, Paul Gentile.
"The Court of Appeals has cast aside a good judge without good reason," Gentile said.
He quoted his client as saying, "I look around and see the corruption and wrongdoing of judges being reported. I did nothing wrong and I'm removed."

Gentile was even more ferocious in comments to the New York Times, saying that the disciplinary committee was engaged in "a bureaucratic lynching."

By June, 2004, representing himself, ex-Judge Mason was a bit more contrite as he surrendered his law license:

[Mason] acknowledges that there is a disciplinary proceeding presently pending against him alleging conversion, failing to promptly pay or deliver to a third person funds that person was entitled to receive, commingling, improperly issuing escrow checks to cash, and providing inaccurate and misleading responses to the Commission on Judicial Conduct. He also acknowledges that he cannot successfully defend himself on the merits against such charges.

The judge's refusal to follow the law on the bench had no negative consequences.  But refusal to follow the law in his private life meant professional ruin.  The difference, I suppose, is that Judge Mason personally pocketed his brother-in-law's rent money, while (as far as we know) he received no direct personal benefit from his declaration of independence from New York law.

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