About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

Powered by Squarespace
What's not to like?

Hit the "like" button on Facebook to be notified of mini-blog entries and new posts and columns.

In Our Name
Test Drive the Book!
« 118. Correlations | Main | 116. Fatuity watch »
Wednesday
May312006

117. Slate silliness

Slate, usually a bastion of intelligence on the web, ran an article by Alexandra Natapoff, a professor of law, that includes this passage:

And so people plead guilty, at a rate of 90 percent to 95 percent. The criminal trial is nearly extinct. Most defendants never get the benefits of the constitutional protections contained in the Bill of Rights. To be charged with a crime means, in practice, that you will most likely plead guilty to a crime, not because you are guilty, but because the system offers no other realistic options.

This state of affairs has eroded our collective bedrock intuition that people are innocent until proven guilty.

"Collective bedrock" sounds like an exercise in Jungian geology.  And it's the very opposite of an intuition to say that people are innocent until proven guilty.  Our intuition, when confronted with evidence of wrongdoing, tends much more in the direction of the multitude's response to the accusation against Susannah.  Daniel's ratiocination was the unintuitive approach.  The idea that people are innocent until proved guilty is a learned attitude, a mark of civilization.

I hope the professor isn't saying that because a person is innocent until proven guilty, therefore people who plead guilty are innocent, because their guilt hasn't been proven. 

A friend of mine was once on a Law Day panel with a judge at a high school.  In response to a student's question, my friend said casually, Well, of course the exclusionary rule means that guilty people go free.  The judge said: That's not right.  If the evidence is suppressed, they can't be found guilty.

Well, it all depends on what your definition of "guilty" is, I suppose.  If "guilty" means the jury's foreperson signed that particular verdict form, then both the judge and the professor are correct.  But if "guilty" is defined instead as the condition of one who has committed a crime, they're both wrong.

Anyway, speaking as an appellate lawyer working for an Attorney General's office, and knowing something about the huge backlog of appeals awaiting action in the offices of our counterparts in the New Mexico Public Defender's office, I feel I'm on pretty firm ground when I say that, out here in the sticks at least, the criminal trial is "nearly extinct" in roughly the same sense in which Canada geese are.

The word "charged", as used by the professor, is ambiguous.  Most people, I think, would say a person arrested by police has been charged.  In fact, the American Heritage dictionary provides this illustrative usage: "The police charged him with car theft."

A significant percentage of those charged in the dictionary's sense don't plead guilty for the simple reason that they're not prosecuted.  You can find the figures in post 58: the annual number of arrests vastly exceeds the number of convictions.  If you prefer anecdotal evidence, there's Edward Conlon's memoir, a pertinent excerpt from which is given in post 100

In Albuquerque, a medium-sized city (# 33 in the nation based on actual city population, or # 62 by the more realistic metropolitan statistical area ranking - I sometimes get the impression that most people living elsewhere think we're more like this), about one-third of all arrests are not followed by prosecution.  That's been the average for years, or so I've been informed by folks familiar with the administration of the Bernalillo County DA's office. 

A paralegal whose job was to screen drug cases told me about 20% of the cases didn't get past her desk.  And - of course - in every single one of those cases we can be absolutely certain that somebody had violated the law. 

These are rough figures, and we should cushion them with fat margins of error.  Even so, there's no escaping the conclusion that a lot of arrestees are never prosecuted.  

If the professor is using "charged" in the more technical sense, to refer to a pleading that survives the initial determination of probable cause, then she seems to be saying that probable cause doesn't correspond to factual guilt more than half the time ("most likely").  In drug cases, that's just silly: the same cocaine in your pocket simultaneously establishes both probable cause and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In non-drug cases, my guess is that findings of probable cause correspond to factual guilt far more accurately than do guilty verdicts.    That's because guilty verdicts are, or ought to be, based on a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  By adopting such a very high standard of proof we ensure that a great number of very guilty people avoid punishment.  Al Capone was never convicted of murder, but that means only he was not guilty,  not that he was innocent

 My guess is that Professor Natapoff was hyperventilating in the style of those advocates who flash alarming statistics to draw attention to their cause: 4 out of 5 Americans will, at some point in their lives, suffer from [insert your favored syndrome or disease here].  And I certainly don't dispute her basic point, that resources should be poured into the defense of indigent criminals.  But fully 1,724% of state legislators indicate that the publication of silly hyperbole in online magazines makes them less likely to vote for increased funding for the cause in question.

Reader Comments (2)

Mr. Jacobsen, You're an excellent writer and critical legal analyst, and I very much enjoy reading your posts. Please continue with your excellent work.
What I saw in this excerpt, however, was an attempt to describe -- perhaps too dramatically from your critical writer's perspective -- what has become of the right to jury trial under the modern criminal justice regime in many jurisdictions due to mandatory sentencing, mandated consecutive sentencing, no parole, and multiplicitous definition of offenses -- a regime the Framers would hardly recognize today. In such a jurisdiction, a defendant may face 15 to 30 years mandatory imprisonment in a typical case if convicted -- and he usually will be convicted if we accept your realistic factual premises -- but prosecutors seeking, as representatives of the government, the punishment they believe is appropriate, will readily accept a guilty plea to an offense(s) bringing, for example, 3-5 years. Looking at it from a "presumed innocent" perspective, a perspective you may consider pollyannish in the abstract, we, nonetheless, are effectively being told that the government considers the appropriate punishment for your offense to be 3-5 years, but if you want to exercise your right to jury trial and make us work for it, it will cost you 10-30 more years to exercise that right. A former state Attorney General here expressed the situation, perhaps unintentionally, but quite aptly and succinctly, when, expressing only tepid legal support for another mandatory sentence offense before a criminal justice committee (as an elective official, still not opposing the bill), he explained: "Don't get me wrong, prosecutors love mandatory sentences; we can use them to get the defendant to plead guilty to what he did."
I suspect that was effectively the point the professor was trying to make. Perhaps, the rhetorical point registered high on your fatuity scale, but it's a point that many who've worked both sides of the criminal justice system recognize, and nearly as many probably are reluctant to acknowledge because of its unfortunate political utility in our criminal justice systems.
June 1, 2006 | Unregistered Commenterb.odonnell
That's why you should be writing for Slate.
June 1, 2006 | Registered CommenterJoel Jacobsen

PostPost a New Comment

Enter your information below to add a new comment.

My response is on my own website »
Author Email (optional):
Author URL (optional):
Post:
 
All HTML will be escaped. Hyperlinks will be created for URLs automatically.