About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

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Wednesday
22Mar2006

86. Vigorous epithets

In Michigan a few years back, a police officer shot and killed an unarmed person while on-duty.  A well-known lawyer publicly called the officer a "murderer" and "executioner."  The officer sued the lawyer, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, explaining that "rhetorical hyperbole" and the use of "vigorous epithets" and "exaggerated language" is never actionable defamation

The same lawyer, referring to a different decision from the same court, characterized it as the work of "three jackass court of appeals judges".  He also said the members of the panel had changed their names from Hitler, Goebbels and Eva Braun.  Mere vigorous epithets and rhetorical hyperbole?

Well, no.  The attorney in question is Geoffrey Fieger, Michigan celebrity lawyerpublicity hound, political martyr and sometime politician.  Every state seems to have its own alpha lawyer.  Out West the fellow dresses in a fringed leather jacket or bears a catchy nickname like Racehorse.   But Fieger is from Detroit.  Not the smoothly harmonious Detroit of the Four Tops and Smokey Robinson, but the rude white-boy Detroit of Eminem, Iggy Pop and the MC5.  

As Law.com reported yesterday, the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission is going after Fieger, contending that he violated Michigan Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.5, which provides: "A lawyer shall not: ... (c) engage in undignified or discourteous conduct toward the tribunal."  

The Commission lost in front of the Michigan Attorney Grievance Board, which concluded that the rule didn't apply to statements made outside the courtroom, and anyway there are some pretty obvious first amendment problems associated with depriving someone of the right to practice his profession on the ground of impoliteness.  The Commission then appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court ( I wonder how often that happens).

The Commission describes itself on its website as "the investigative and prosecutorial arm of the Michigan Supreme Court for allegations of attorney misconduct. "  You might expect that anyone who served as the prosecutorial arm of a court would want to disguise the confusion of roles, but apparently not.  At any rate, the Commission's position seems to be that "rhetorical hyperbole," "vigorous epithets" and "exaggerated language" are protected by the first amendment only when directed at people less exalted than judges.   Such as, say, police officers.

It's a bit hard to believe the Commission would pursue the matter so relentlessly without a few pats on the head from the hand that feeds it.  Could it all be related to the fact that Fieger devoted nearly half a million dollars to an unsuccessful attempt to unseat a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court?

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