74. Pass the salt

Twenty years ago, Professor Daniel Farber wrote an essay called The Case against Brilliance in which he pointed out the dangers of "brilliant" statutory interpretation:

If Paul Pedestrian asks someone to pass the salt, one might argue that he "really" must mean, "pass a healthful and taste-enhancing condiment"--a description that does not apply to salt, if current medical theories are correct. So in some sense, what Paul "really" means is "pass the pepper." 

70 Minn. L. Rev. 917, 927.  (For a summary, click here and search for "brilliance.")

Just in case you think Farber's example might be exaggerated, along come the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.  According to Howard Bashman of How Appealing, writing in Law.com, both courts were confronted with a question under the Class Action Fairness Act and

[b]oth courts have ruled that even though the statutory language authorizes an appeal to be requested "not less than 7 days after entry of the order," the statute should instead be construed to mean directly the opposite of what it says, thereby imposing a deadline for requesting an appeal of "not more than 7 days after entry of the order."