About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

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In Our Name
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« 41. Supreme Court clerks | Main | 39. Alito the Beaver »
Saturday
Jan072006

40. Judge vs. Jury (part 2)

Two basic assumptions underlie the American system of jury trials.  The first is that trial by jury is  "the spinal column of American democracy" (Scalia).   Or, if that's a bit too anatomical for your taste, it's also "the grand bulwark of [our] liberties" (Blackstone) and "the very palladium of free government” (Hamilton). 

The second assumption is that jurors are overly-emotional morons, incapable of thinking clearly about anything. 

For example, a person charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm has a constitutional right to a jury trial.  The bulwark of liberty is there f0r him.  But if the jurors were to learn the name of the person's prior felony, the probability is high that they would be so carried away with shock and abhorrence that they would convict the defendant for that reason alone, regardless of the other evidence, their oaths, the judge's instructions, and any shred of civic or moral responsibility they may possess.  They would, in short, "misuse" the evidence.

The very idea that a jury can "misuse" evidence is a peculiar one.  Any use a jury makes of evidence must, by definition, seem reasonable to at least twelve people.  (Anyway, if we don't assume juries are rational, what's the point of jury trials?  Surely  American democracy doesn't have a twisted spinal column!)  It follows that the evidence is probative of the point for which the jury considers it, because otherwise the jury's use of it wouldn't be reasonable.  Back in 1947, the Supreme Court summed it up nicely: "Much evidence of real and substantial probative value goes out on considerations irrelevant to its probative weight but relevant to possible misunderstanding or misuse by the jury."

To understand why it's "misuse" for a jury to draw reasonable conclusions from "evidence of real and substantial probative value",  you have to turn to the second basic assumption.   In a recent unpublished decision, the Washington Court of Appeals explained: "When evidence is likely to stimulate an emotional response rather than a rational decision, a danger of unfair prejudice exists."  That is, there are occasions when juries are likely to make irrational, emotional decisions.

In the particular case under consideration, one woman - woman A - told a male acquaintance that she suspected he had something to do with woman B's mysterious disappearance.  (In fact, he had killed her, as was subsequently proved.)  Immediately after woman A voiced her suspicion, he attacked her, tried to rape her and eventually wound up masturbating on her.  He was convicted of "indecent liberties." 

The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that there was too great a danger that the jury convicted him of indecent liberties against woman A not on the basis of her extremely detailed account of the crime, but rather on the basis of her suspicion that he had committed a different crime against woman B.

If you accept the first assumption about juries, the Washington court's decision is simply ludicrous.  Palladia of free government don't act like that.  But if you accept the second assumption, the decision makes perfect sense.  The ability to toggle back and forth between the two assumptions while keeping at bay any insight into their contradiction is an important skill for any judge to master.

Reader Comments (5)

I think I should be a judge, because I think it's easy to reconcile the two ideas about juries. Trials are necessarily a very incomplete story of what happened, and in lots of circumstances juries are very good at talking it out and reaching a rational decision despite this incomplete story. However, when there's a juicy bit of emotionally charged evidence without the rest of the story to balance it out (and there is almost never the rest of the story to balance it out), juries are really, really bad at coming to a rational decision. So, leave out the really juicy bits, and juries do a good job. But if the juicy bits are also really central to establishing the facts of the case, then you've got to let them in anyway and hope justice is done. Seems pretty easy. I should totally be a judge.
January 8, 2006 | Unregistered CommenterBob
mobile phone noikia

nokiawad9981
March 3, 2009 | Unregistered Commenternokiawadd
<a href=http://mwave.com.ua/brand/whirlpool/58/>Whirlpool</a>
Go on this way.You found an interesting issue to develop.

ksoleifdjj388
March 5, 2009 | Unregistered CommenterWhirlpool
i have been trying hard to understand why Jury system should not be accepted in India , a multi-ethnic , casteridden elitist ruler driven society.After going through the article and the comments i am hungry for more . I solicit those academicians , social reformers and extremely vigile citizens of your country to expend my horizon so that i could raise the issue , debate till the Jury system is accepted in principle and finally become the part of our constitution.
What i perceive in gist is as follows :-
The jury system has the potential to empower the lower castes ( lower strata , the economically backwards as well ) .
It will empower the women , simply by accepting 3 : 2 male to female Jury ratio.
It has the potential to change the mindset of the people at large . A fisherman's wife , a dalit sweeper's wife as Jury delivering justice to erstwhile RAJA of X and Nawab of Y in full public view will be beginning of the end of Elitist Judicial system in India.
June 18, 2009 | Unregistered Commenterharidas mandal
This is a great blog with excellent posts and links.
Thanks for sharing.
November 11, 2011 | Unregistered Commenterdk spil

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