About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

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Tuesday
03Jan2006

37. Call your important witnesses before lunch

In every town of any size, there's at least one judge of whom it's conventionally said: "Just make sure you put your important witnesses on before lunch."  Because after lunch the judge's alcohol-fuzzed evidentiary rulings become erratic.  The lawyers will crack jokes under their breath about it, but then they deal with it, more or less the same way they deal with stupid judges, or a malfunctioning PA system.  They work around it.

(One of the disillusioning moments of every lawyer's first year of practice is the realization that some judge cannot follow your perfectly clear and well-supported argument.  As a law student you're taught that judges are fonts of wisdom.  As, indeed, some are.)

Drinking has been an accepted part of legal culture at least since the day of the tavern-haunting lawyers parodied in Joseph Andrews (book II, chapter 3).  The ABA says the alcoholism rate among lawyers is twice the rate in the general population.  I'm surprised it's only double.  The law is a liquid profession.

Shortly before the holidays the Washington Post ran this chat about drunk driving with a researcher at the National Highway Traffic Safety Commission.  As the researcher explains, the number of DUI-related deaths remains very high, over 16,000 a year in the United States.  The issue gets a lot of ink and a lot of air time.  Yet the single biggest roadblock to DUI enforcement is never mentioned in public.  It's this: judges go easy on the crimes they themselves commit.

It's a safe bet that most American judges have driven drunk one time or another.   The experiences of Judge Davis and Justice Resnick, detailed in post 36 and post 33, are unusual only in that the cops who stopped them had the resolve to report them.  Those judges who have never committed the crime almost certainly know family members or friends who have. 

It's natural that judges identify with drunk drivers.  And we all know that when you identify with a person, you want to help that person out.  That dynamic plays itself out in America's courtrooms every day.  That's why DUI dismissal rates are reduced when observers are in the courtroom -- the sense of identification is interrupted when the judge gets self-conscious.  But it's also why dismissal is rare in cases involving repeat offenders or grossly high BACs.  What judge wants to identify with an out-and-out, abject loser? 

The more the defendant resembles the judge (or the way the judge remembers himself back in his college days), the greater the likelihood of dismissal or acquittal.

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