About This Blog

Judging Crimes is a blog about criminal law, violent crime and the judiciary, dedicated to making the liberal case for greater democratic control of the criminal justice system.  It's a "view from the trenches" because it's written by a practitioner, not an academic or journalist.  It examines the changing role of the judiciary in American society by looking at what judges actually do, rather than what they say.  I know what they do because I deal with the consequences every day. 

Opinions issued by judges, from Supreme Court justices on down, are justifications for the exercise of governmental power.  But it is the exercise of power itself that should command our attention, not the justifications.  Judging Crimes is concerned with the reality of judicial power rather than the verbal formulas used to defend it. 

American law professors have long liked to say they teach their students "to think like a lawyer."  Learning to think that way is a matter of internalizing certain assumptions.  The practice of judging is likewise based on a foundation of shared assumptions, among them that the United States Constitution -- a document of 8,335 words, the length of a book chapter -- provides an answer to every question.  Rather like a Ouija board.

These assumptions are so ingrained -- and their internalization is so necessary to the successful practice of law -- that most people who subscribe to them aren't even aware of having done so.  Judging Crimes will try to engage not just with the expressions of judicial power, but with the assumptions on which those expressions  rest.  

Judging Crimes won't be filled with daily entries commenting on the day's events or provide a best-of-the-web welter of links.  Many other blogs already do that, far better than I could hope to do.  (Check out these.)  Instead, Judging Crimes will contain pieces of a length that might seem long for a blog but would be short in a serious magazine.  I hope to post new pieces several times a week.

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« 45. Courtroom Reality | Main | 43. The FBI system »
Thursday
Jan122006

44. Alito and O'Connor

Dahlia Lithwick comments on Judge Alito's faint praise for Sandra Day O'Connor.  Alito's tribute to O'Connor during his opening statement came very close to snideness: "Justice O'Connor has been a pioneer, and her dedicated service on the Supreme Court will never be forgotten. And the people of the country certainly owe her a great debt for the service that she has provided."  Thanks for being the first woman on the Supreme Court, Sandy.  Oh, and for all your hard work.  Um, yeah, and ...  and the case-by-case approach.  Yeah, that too.  Thanks.

O'Connor is despised by movement conservatives and legal academics for the same reason: she didn't know the answer to every question ten years in advance.  O'Connor understood how a courtroom worked.  She generally had a clue about what the Court's rulings would mean in practical terms.  She saw the Supreme Court as a vehicle for coping with problems in the American justice system.  The striking thing about her best opinions is that they need no gloss.  They are perfectly clear, they foresaw and dealt with practical difficulties, and they have proved imminently workable in real life.  Examples include Strickland v. WashingtonColeman v. Thompson and Williams v. Taylor.

People like Scalia and, it would seem, Alito, despise that approach to judging.  For them, the answer comes first, the question afterward. 

It seems that most law professors equally despise practicality on the Supreme Court.   As far as I can tell, there are three reasons for this.  First, most law professors don't engage in the day-to-day practice of law, and many of them never did so (being a junior associate at a big firm doesn't count), so they have no way to evaluate practicality, or even recognize it.  For another thing, perfectly clear and workable opinions leave little for legal academics to write about.   (It's like an English professor contemplating Arnold Bennett -- what's there to say that Bennett didn't spell out?  And so another paper on The Golden Bowl is born.) 

But the most telling point is suggested by Professors Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry in their book Desperately Seeking Certainty: The Misguided Quest for Constitutional Foundations.  It's this: law professors  like to think up constitutional "theories of everything."  It's natural that people who devote their intellectual energies, not to mention their careers, to such pursuits would tend to admire justices who do the same.  So justices like Antonin Scalia and William O. Douglas become favorites in the academy.

Read just a handful of the opinions of Scalia and Douglas and you'll realize that each believes/believed that he is/was smarter than all his colleagues combined.  As Ms. Lithwick suggests, Alito's performance at his confirmation hearing suggests he, too, is of that ilk.   Her plaintive question will doubtless haunt us for the next 35 years, until Sam Alito, too, is wheeled off the Court by an orderly spraying Lysol in his wake: "Is there something to be said for a nominee, like John Roberts, who didn't insist that the answer to every question reside exclusively in his own open mind?"

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