28. Reaching the Optimal Level of Cop-Killings

One hundred and fifty three police officers have been killed in the line of duty so far in 2005, including traffic accidents.  That's actually a relatively low number.  One reason the number of cop-murders isn't higher is "increased use of body armor," indicating somewhat ironically that even cops are caught up in the privatization of law enforcement.  (See post 1.)  Officers have to take individual responsibility for their own safety, bearing the cost in terms of discomfort and restricted movement, just as the responsibility for protecting neighborhoods has been largely transferred from the police themselves to individual homeowners, who bear the costs of home security.

The Supreme Court forbids state and federal courts from letting juries learn of the existence of evidence seized by police executing a "no-knock" search warrant -- unless the officers have  "reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be [a] dangerous or [b] futile, or that it would [c] inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence." 

Whether the officer's suspicion is reasonable is determined by a judge examining the matter months or even years after the fact, in the quiet of his or her chambers, after hearing lawyers hash it out at great length.  But even if the officer's suspicion is deemed to be not merely correct (otherwise there would be no court case) but reasonable, the evidence is still hidden from the jury unless the officer's' suspicion fits in one of the three sub-categories set forth by the Supreme Court.

Justice Stevens  explains that "[t]his standard ... strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries."  Stevens' use of the scale metaphor (see post 10) disguises the significance of what he's saying.  He means that the interpretation his Court gives the fourth amendment has been calibrated to achieve the  optimal number of cop-killings.

It sounds brutal stated like that, but what else does the justice means when he refers to "the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue"?  By far the most significant "concern" is that you might see your arterial blood spurting across the floor of some tweaking methhead's lab.  Stevens' point is that some Americans have to have their privacy violated, and some cops have to be murdered, and the Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence adjusts the ratio between them, just as you might adjust the balance between your stereo's speakers.